Data integrity
What
ALCOA++ means
It is the data-integrity rule that governs everything we deliver. It comes from the ALCOA+ standard — the nine attributes expected of a record in a regulated environment — which we write and apply with two plus signs, the way we write it on all our documents.
The nine attributes
A record must be able to answer on its own
The trace
What every entry carries
Append-only
You add, you never erase. A previous value cannot disappear from the record.
An entry even on failure
A refused login, a rejected rule, an invalid entry: the event leaves a trace.
Chained
Every entry depends on the previous one. Editing, moving or inserting something shows.
The texts
What the four jurisdictions require
All four are technologically neutral: they state what the record must say, never the brand of the tool.
United States — FDA
21 CFR Part 11: functional requirements. A secure, computer-generated, time-stamped audit trail that does not obscure or erase the previous value. Electronic signatures unique to one individual, using two components.
China — NMPA
Records and data management, 2020 announcement No. 74: management and technical measures so that information is true, accurate, complete and traceable. An electronic record must at least equal the function of paper.
Japan — PIC/S
PI 041-1 (“Good Practices for Data Management and Integrity”, in force since 1 July 2021) and its nine attributes, plus the guideline on electronic records and signatures.
Canada — Health Canada
The Health Canada data-integrity guidelines, the same ALCOA family. Worth noting: Canada co-sponsors the CMVP with NIST, so a FIPS-type request can come from a Canadian client.
Straight talk
What we say plainly
- A hash chain detects, it does not prove. The hash is recomputable by anyone who can write the file: change a line, recompute the chain, and the verification passes. Non-repudiation needs a signature that requires a secret. We say this rather than selling a chain as proof.
- No approved-hardware list exists in these regulations. What exists are lists of certified cryptographic modules — FIPS 140-3 (the NIST CMVP, co-sponsored by Canada) and Common Criteria — which some quality departments like to cite. The real subject is elsewhere.
- A SHA-1 era chip cannot be defended — not because it is absent from a list, but because SHA-1 was withdrawn from the algorithms approved for signatures. SHA-1 in an identity chain does not stand in front of an inspector.
- An exception must be dated, justified and closed. Any list that lets a machine in without an identity is an audit finding in itself.
- A shared account traces nobody. The administrator role stays, but it is carried by named accounts — one per employee, on the workstation as well.